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Warranties, performance, and the resolution 
of buyer-seller disputes 
Thomas Palfrey* 
and 
Thomas Romer** 
Many disputes between buyers and sellers concern product quality and whether a claim 
of poor product performance is covered by a warranty issued by the seller. We develop an 
analytical framework in which average product quality, buyer preferences, production and 
transaction costs, and the extent to which "true" quality can be observed by buyer and 
seller interact to determine warranties, product price, and the likelihood of disputes. Using 
this framework, we examine the impact of various types of dispute resolution mechanisms 
(DRM's) on these outcomes. We relate features of DRM's, such as cost and accuracy, to 
prices, warranties, and allocative efficiency of the market in which disputes arise. 
1. Introduction 
• Mechanisms to resolve consumer disputes have been a major focus of the call for 
alternative ways to deal with relatively small disputes. Considerable energy has been spent 
documenting the consequences of not having adequate means to resolve disputes between 
buyers and sellers (Best and Andreasen, 1977; Nader, 1979). A fairly large literature has 
arisen that discusses the pros and cons of various attempts to deal with these problems. 1 
Municipal, state, and federal agencies have made consumer dispute resolution a matter 
of policy interest. 2 
A basic premise of our research is that to study the resolution of disputes properly, 
one must take into account the effect of the dispute resolution mechanism (DRM) on 
the actual occurrence of disputes and on the environment in which the original trans-
actions take place. To do this, a theory in which disputes arise within the framework of 
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1 The bibliography by Sander and Snyder ( 1979) includes 28 entries on consumer disputes. 
2 To take just one example, consider the Federal Trade Commission. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the 
FTC has a mandate to encourage the development and implementation of mechanisms to resolve consumer 
disputes. FTC Rule 703 (16 CFR 703) defines the requirements a firm must satisfy if it specifies a dispute 
resolution mechanism as part of a warranty. The FTC staff has compiled a booklet that intends to assist 
companies in setting up such mechanisms (FTC, 1980a). In cases ranging from land sales (Great Western United 
Corp., 81 FTC 661 (1972)) to household furniture (Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 87 FTC 26 (1976)), the 
Commission has made participation in a dispute resolution mechanism (typically use of the Better Business 
Bureau) part of the settlement decree. In a recent policy review session on Post-Purchase Remedies, consumer 
dispute resolution was prominently featured (FTC, 1980b ). 
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the model is needed. Although it is often recognized that the nature of the DRM available 
if there is a dispute may well affect the likelihood of disputes as well as their ultimate 
outcomes, systematic analysis of such interactions is scarce.3 We believe that an under-
standing of the interaction between DRM's and the environment in which they operate 
is essential if we are to answer questions about the desirability of encouraging or imposing 
particular types of DRM's. 
The variety of buyer-seller disputes is enormous, ranging from those caused by false 
advertising and unfair sales practices to the collection of unpaid debts of credit card users. 
Our focus, however, is narrower. This article addresses a type of dispute that arises in 
conjunction with guaranteed products: disputes over warranty performance. Simply stated, 
a consumer seeks performance under a warranty contract and the seller refuses to perform. 
More specifically, our approach deals with warranties that insure the characteristics of a 
good or service at the time of sale. Most commonly, the characteristics in question are 
referred to as quality or durability. Warranties of this type exist because the buyer is 
unable to ascertain the relevant characteristics of the good before purchase. The warranty 
contract simply stipulates that the consumer will receive compensation if the character-
istics of the good at the time of purchase are x and will not receive compensation if the 
characteristics of the good at time of purchase are not x. 
A major problem arises in contracts of this sort. When a claim for compensation is 
made by the consumer, it may not be possible to observe without error whether the 
characteristics of the good or service at the time of sale were x.4 This may render en-
forcement of the contract difficult, if not impossible. In such cases, one would expect 
disputes to arise naturally between buyers and sellers, with buyers seeking performance 
of the contract and sellers claiming that the contract does not apply. This difference of 
opinion can occur even when the seller is acting in good faith. In the model we present 
here, purely fraudulent behavior on the part of the seller is explicitly excluded. It is, then, 
a theory of "good faith" disputes. 
To keep matters simple, we consider a good that can have only two possible quality 
levels-high or low. The seller sets a price and offers the good for sale under one of three 
possible warranty policies-no warranty, conditional warranty, or unconditional war-
ranty. After purchase, a buyer observes a noisy signal about the quality of the unit, which 
provides (imperfect) information that the unit is either likely to be high quality or likely 
to be low quality. The buyer has a claim strategy or decision rule that maps the price, 
the warranty, and the noisy signal into a decision either to keep the unit as it is, to make 
a claim under the warranty, or simply to purchase a new unit. 
Claim procedures are costly, so that if a buyer initiates a claim, he incurs some cost 
and imposes a (possibly different) cost on the seller. If a buyer makes a claim under a 
warranty, the seller observes a noisy signal (possibly different from that received by the 
buyer) about whether the warranty applies. If the seller decides on the basis of this in-
formation that the warranty does not apply, he refuses the claim, and we say that a dispute 
has occurred. 
3 But see Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) for an analysis in this spirit, though in a very different setting 
(divorce). 
4 Moreover, the true quality at the time the claim is made may not even be observable without error. For 
example, if the good is a durable, there is no reason to believe that the entire future stream of services that the 
good will provide the buyer is perfectly known. Alternatively, there may be uncertainty about the meaning of 
the warranty itself. For example, limited warranties often say that the product is guaranteed to last a certain 
length of time as long as "the instructions for use are carefully followed." Such conditions are not only unob-
servable, but they may even be vacuous (in the sense that such limitations may be legally forbidden). Warranty 
contracts often contain such clauses, some of which may have no legal basis, some of which involve unobservable 
events, and some of which are written in complicated "legalese." This suggests that uncertainty arises because 
the buyer (and perhaps even the seller) does not know the condition that determines when a remedy is required. 
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Although in some respects our framework for analyzing product quality, information, 
and warranties follows that of the recent economics literature, we deviate from the stan-
dard approach in an important way. In the usual models of warranties and product 
quality, either the buyer or the seller is assumed to be able to ascertain perfectly the 
quality of the product when a warranty claim is made. 5 There can be no good faith 
disputes in such markets-and, in fact, these models never consider the question of 
warranty performance. In our framework, use of the product may provide a buyer with 
more information about the quality of the good than he had at the time of purchase, but 
still does not yield perfect information about true quality. Similarly, inspection by the 
seller when a claim is made makes the seller more informed than he was before but still 
leaves some uncertainty. Consequently, disputes arise endogenously in our framework. 
In the absence of relatively inexpensive ways to resolve such disputes, the seller's 
word is typically the last one. In Section 2 we analyze this "no DRM" situation and 
characterize market outcomes in the absence of any third-party mechanism to resolve 
disputes. We examine the following questions in the context of a simple model of a 
product market with warranties. What type of warranty will be offered? What will be the 
price? How is the price related to the warranty? When will disputes occur? How efficient 
are the market outcomes? The answers depend, in a systematic way, on such factors as 
production and transaction costs, buyer preferences, and the degree of information im-
perfections. 
We explore this dependence in Section 3, and we illustrate it by characterizing the 
equilibrium as a function of underlying variables for a particular value of average product 
quality. We find that in equilibrium disputes will arise over a wide range of buyer pref-
erences, production and inspection costs, and informativeness of buyer and seller signals 
about true quality. If inspection costs are very high, we find, not surprisingly, that war-
ranties will not be offered. Although one might expect that warranty coverage is most 
extensive when inspection costs are very low, we find that this is not necessarily the case. 
Very low inspection costs can lead to an equilibrium in which no warranty is offered. 
Section 4 extends the model in a natural way to include dispute resolution mecha-
nisms to which buyers may appeal if disagreements arise. The arguments for various 
dispute resolution mechanisms are generally based on the expectation that such mech-
anisms will enhance the well-being of participants in the market. Our framework allows 
us to focus on many of the attributes that most writers on dispute resolution have deemed 
important characteristics of DRM's: cost, allocation of cost between parties, accuracy of 
outcome, and tendency to bias.6 Through a number of examples, we highlight a surpris-
ingly broad range of possible outcomes. We find that mechanisms for resolving disputes 
may indeed have significant effects on the warranty that is offered and the price at which 
the commodity is sold. These effects can result in either an increase or reduction of overall 
market efficiency, even if the DRM is procedurally "perfect." In particular, we find that 
5 Recent contributions to the study of warranties when there are imperfections in information include 
Appelbaum and Scheffman ( 1980), Courville and Hausman (1979), Simon (1981 ), and Spence (1977), to name 
only a few. The models used by these authors are not set up in a way that allows examination of questions 
relating to buyer-seller disputes. In all these models, once a claim is made, all uncertainty is resolved. Hence 
there is no possibility for disputes to arise. Informational considerations focus on consumers' lack of knowledge 
or their "misperceptions" about average quality, and warranties are a means of raising buyers' estimates of 
average quality. This is in contrast to our model, in which buyer and seller both have the same (correct) 
information about average quality, but true quality is not fully known by either party when a claim is made. 
Enforcement of a warranty is, consequently, no longer a clear-cut matter. 
The approach of Simon ( 1981) comes closest to ours. She allows the consumer to retain some uncertainty 
about seller liability before making a claim. In other respects, Simon's model is quite different from ours. For 
example, Simon has the warranty exogenously fixed by law and defined in terms of guaranteed average quality. 
Also, as with the other models, there is no possibility for disputes over the validity of a warranty claim. 
6 See Johnson ( 1978) for a thorough discussion of these and other attributes of DRM's. 
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a DRM that is costless, perfectly accurate, and not biased in favor of either buyer or seller 
can reduce market efficiency, even though it may both reduce the number of disputes 
and increase the extent of warranty coverage offered by the seller in equilibrium. The 
reason for this conflict between procedural and efficiency considerations is that a DRM 
can have adverse incentive effects on buyer claim strategies. When this is the case, costly, 
inaccurate, and biased procedures may produce superior market performance. Because 
of such effects, a DRM cannot simply be evaluated on the basis of such intrinsic qualities 
as "fairness," accuracy, or direct cost to the disputing parties. Nor can these judgments 
be based only on whether a DRM causes a stronger warranty to be offered or how the 
likelihood of disputes is affected. 7 
The article concludes with a section that briefly discusses some important aspects of 
the warranty framework and points toward possibilities for its further application and 
extension. 
2. Warranty equilibrium without a mechanism to resolve 
disputes but in which disputes are possible 
• Consider an environment in which a single seller faces a (potentially large) number 
of consumers. 8 The seller has access to or can produce unlimited quantities of a com-
modity at constant unit cost c. The quality of a given unit of this commodity is either 
high or low. The a priori probability that any unit is of high quality is exogenously fixed 
at t, and the probability of low quality is 1 - t. These probabilities are independent of 
the qualities of other units. We shall often refer to a high quality unit as "good" and to 
a low quality unit as "bad." 
Buyers are assumed to be identical in their valuation of the commodity. Each buyer 
values (in dollar terms) a high quality unit at Vi and a low quality unit at V,. Without 
loss of generality, we shall assume that V, = 0. 
Buyers and seller are risk neutral. This allows us to focus on those aspects of the 
problem that have to do with the information structure, rather than attitude toward risk. 
Before a unit is purchased, neither buyer nor seller has any specific information about 
an individual unit's true quality, but the probability tis common knowledge to all parties. 
Once a buyer has purchased a unit, he gains some information about the true quality of 
the object. This is modeled in the following way. Upon purchasing a unit and using it 
for a short period of time, a buyer judges whether the quality is high, which will generate 
a stream of value over time equal to Vi, or low, which will generate a stream of value 
over time of 0. Sometimes this judgment is correct and sometimes it is wrong. The 
probability that the buyer judges quality correctly is q, and this probability is independent 
of true quality.9 
The buyer may return the object to the seller, in exchange for some form of com-
pensation conditional on the quality of the unit. If an object is returned to the seller, the 
seller makes a judgment about the quality of the unit. As was the case with the buyer, 
7 The central role of imperfect information on the parts of both buyers and seller should be self-evident 
at this point. For an excellent discussion and survey of general policy questions relating to consumer product 
markets when there is imperfect information, see Schwartz and Wilde ( 1979). Although we do not consider the 
same set of specific issues they considered, very broadly speaking we do adopt a similar strategy for analyzing 
the problem. That is, our approach involves an examination of the interactions among: (a) market equilibrium 
(i.e., prices, qualities, and warranties); (b) informational considerations; (c) institutional environment (DRM's 
in our case); and (d) incentives generated for market participants. 
8 The model may also be applied to competitive markets with many sellers. The monopoly case has the 
virtue of simplicity: it is a useful vehicle for displaying the framework. 
9 More generally, we could allow the buyer to be more likely to err when true quality is high than when 
it is low, or vice versa. This involves only a notational modification of our framework. 
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the seller does not make perfect judgments. The probability that the seller judges a unit 
correctly is q-the same as the probability that the buyer makes a correct judgment. 10 
Transaction costs are an important element of our model. We assume that in making 
a purchase the buyer incurs a shopping cost cb in addition to the price. Processing claims 
under a warranty typically involves the investment of time and valuable resources by 
both buyer and seller. To capture this, we introduce a return cost to the buyer, which we 
take to be equal to cb, and a claim cost to the seller, c,. Each time a buyer makes a claim, 
the buyer incurs cost cb and the seller incurs cost c,, regardless of the outcome of the 
warranty claim. 
Buyers and seller know all the probabilities, as well as the cost and value parameters. 
This completes the information structure in this model. A feature of this framework which 
differentiates it from previous literature on the subject is that it permits imperfect judgment 
of quality. Neither buyer nor seller is a perfect quality assessor. They make judgments 
independently of each other. Sometimes both are right, sometimes the buyer is right and 
the seller is wrong, sometimes the seller is right and the buyer is wrong, and sometimes 
both are wrong. 
In this context, two types of warranty seem natural: money-back guarantees and 
replacement policies. With a money-back guarantee, the buyer is returned the purchase 
price of the unit if a claim is made and the seller agrees that the claim is a valid one. 
With a replacement policy the buyer is given a new unit if a claim is made and the seller 
agrees that the claim is a valid one. For each type of warranty we distinguish between an 
unconditional (which we refer to as "full") warranty and a conditional (which we refer 
to as "partial") warranty. With an unconditional warranty the seller always agrees that 
the buyer's claim is valid; there are "no questions asked." With a conditional warranty, 
the seller promises to perform only if the unit is a bad one. 11 The seller's behavior with 
conditional warranties is to inspect the unit if a claim has been made and then to honor 
the claim if the inspection tells the seller it is a bad unit but to refuse the claim if inspection 
indicates it is not a bad unit. 12 The probability that the seller finds a unit defective is 
determined by the probability q. 
If the seller does replace a unit after a claim has been made, the original warranty 
offered with the first unit also applies to the new replacement unit. Thus, the whole 
procedure described above repeats itself until either the buyer is satisfied (i.e., does not 
make a claim) or the seller refuses a claim. This recursive structure is modeled explicitly 
in our analysis. 
Given the assumptions of our model-especially the assumption that the quality of 
different units is drawn independently from a given (identical) distribution which is known 
to the buyer-it turns out that a money-back guarantee is essentially the same as a 
replacement policy. Suppose a buyer finds it advantageous to buy one unit, finds it 
defective, returns it, and gets his money back. Because of independence, there is no reason 
10 The seller, too, could be allowed to err differentially according to true quality. Moreover, the probabilities 
of buyer error could be different from the probabilities of seller error. In our exposition we have chosen to 
simplify the parameter structure by capturing buyer and seller perceptions with the single variable q, rather than 
the four variables that would be needed if buyer and seller did not have common and symmetric perceptions 
of quality. 
11 We caution the reader that our use of the terms "partial" and "full" warranties does not necessarily 
coincide with their standard legal definitions. The "fullness" of the warranties in our model refers to the range 
of(apparent) product qualities they cover-not to the extent of compensation in the event the warranty is found 
to apply. As an anonymous referee has pointed out, our framework could readily allow for the analysis of 
warranties that offer less than full compensation (e.g., partial refunds), though we do not pursue this here. 
12 Under what we call a Full Warranty, the "customer is always right," so that the seller need not inspect. 
This may make his claim processing cost less than c,. Replacing c, by a parameter c~ < c, would not alter the 
general character of our analysis. We have chosen to use the same c, as the seller's claim cost under Full Warranty 
and Partial Warranty to avoid adding more parameters. 
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for him still not to find it advantageous to buy a second unit. Thus the buyer is indifferent 
between a replacement or a return of the purchase price. The seller is also indifferent 
between the two. In either case, the buyer will end up with a replacement and the seller 
will incur the unit production cost. Because of this essential equivalence, all of the sub-
sequent analysis is done with reference to the replacement type of warranty. 
We should point out that our formulation excludes the possibility that a seller might 
offer a warranty and then always refuse claims, regardless of the outcome of the inspection. 
Our primary intent is to focus on disputes that may emerge because of the imperfections 
of information, rather than on disputes resulting from purely fraudulent behavior. In the 
context of our model, unless a DRM exists, a warranty that was always refused would 
be a vacuous warranty. Since buyers are assumed to be aware of seller behavior, they 
would ascribe zero value to warranties that are never honored. Alternatively, we could 
interpret the seller's parameter q (which is known to buyer and seller alike) simply as a 
variable that characterizes the seller's behavior. Whether this represents "honest" per-
ceptions is not particularly important. What matters is that buyer and seller both act as 
if this probability represents the seller's judgment of the quality of a returned unit. 
D Definition of equilibrium. With this characterization of the market, we proceed as 
follows. A buyer takes the price of a unit of the commodity and the warranty policy (Full 
Warranty, Partial Warranty, or No Warranty) offered by the seller as given. He chooses 
the best response; i.e., the action that maximizes the expected value, net of transaction 
costs, he gets from this market. This involves a decision whether to buy and, if he buys, 
how to act under the warranty. The buyer's choices include: never return a unit; return 
regardless of his judgment about quality; return only if he perceives his unit to be of low 
quality; or discard the unit and repurchase. 13 These decisions generate a response function 
for a buyer. The seller takes this response function as given, and chooses the price and 
warranty policy that maximize the expected profit or seller's surplus-the difference be-
tween expected revenue and expected cost. We shall call the outcome of this interaction 
between buyer and seller the equilibrium in this market. 
In addition to characterizing price and type of warranty, we are interested in the 
relative efficiency of the equilibrium. This involves looking at the total expected surplus 
that obtains. Naturally, there remain important distributional questions (who gets the 
expected surplus) that this focus on total expected surplus does not answer. 
D Calculation of buyer's expected valuations and seller's expected costs under different 
warranties. The buyer's expected valuations under various warranty policies can be de-
rived quite readily. In the following expressions, we define these valuations as being gross 
of price-i.e., the buyer's expected surplus is equal to these valuations minus price. Equiv-
alently, these expected valuations are, in each case, the most that a buyer would be willing 
to pay to buy the commodity ifhe were faced with the given warranty policy and followed 
the stated warranty claim strategy. 
Five cases are of interest. We now define each case and for each one, we calculate 
the buyer's expected valuations. Denote the buyer's expected valuation in these cases as 
Vo, Vi, Vi, Vi, and Vi, respectively. 
Because of the relatively simple recursive structure of our model, it is a straightforward 
13 An equivalent way of interpreting a buyer's return strategy is to view it as a reservation (or "cutoff") 
level that specifies a minimum perceived quality below which the buyer will choose to return or to repurchase. 
The fact that, in our model, a high reservation level necessarily has the buyer returning the unit regardless of 
perceived quality is simply a result of the binary nature of the signal the buyer observes about quality. Returning 
a unit regardless of perceived quality should just be interpreted as having a high reservation level; never returning 
units as having a low reservation level; and returning only perceived bad units as having an intermediate 
reservation level. 
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exercise to write recursion formulas for these expected valuations and to solve them 
directly. It is useful to solve first for v, the buyer's expected valuation gross of shopping 
cost cb. In each case, then 
(1) 
Case (A): No Warranty. Buyer never returns or repurchases commodity. (V0). Since 
Vi = 0, we have 
Vo= tVi 
and 
(2) 
Case (B): No Warranty. Buyer never returns, but discards perceived low-quality unit and 
buys new unit. (Vi). If pis the price of a unit, a recursive expression for v1 is the following: 
V1 = tqVi + (t(l - q) + (1 - t)q](V1 - p - Cb). 
The first term is the value of consuming a high quality unit times the probability the 
purchased unit is correctly judged by the consumer to be high quality. The second term 
is the probability the unit is judged by the consumer to be low quality times the ex ante 
value ofa new unit net of the cost of repurchase, v1 - p - cb. The first term corresponds 
to the event "buyer perceives high quality and does not repurchase," while the second 
term corresponds to the event "buyer perceives low quality, discards unit, and buys a 
new unit." 
Solving for V1 and taking Vi = V1 - Cb give: 
Vi = tqVi - Cb - (t + q(l - 2t)]p (J) 
tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) . 
Case (C): Full Warranty. Buyer returns (i.e., makes a claim under the warranty) if he 
perceives low quality. ( V2). A recursive expression for v2 is 
V2 = tqVi + (t(l - q) + (1 - t)q](V2 - Cb), 
so that 
tqVi - Cb V2 = V2 - Cb = ---"------
tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) (4) 
Case (D): Partial Warranty. Buyer returns if he perceives low quality. (Vi). The recursive 
expression for v3 is: 
[ t(l - q)2 + (1 - t)q2 tq(l - q) J V3 = tqVi + (t(l - q) + (1 - t)q] t(l _ q) + (1 _ t)q V3 + t(l _ q) + (1 _ t)q Vi - Cb • 
The first term in this expression is the same as the first term for the previous case. The 
second term, however, now has three components: a component corresponding to the 
event "seller replaces unit;" a component corresponding to the event "seller refuses claim;" 
and the return cost, cb. The first component is the probability that the seller perceives 
that the unit is low quality, conditional on the buyer perceiving that the unit is low 
quality, 
t(l - q)2 + (1 - t)q2 
t( 1 - q) + ( 1 - t)q ' 
times the values to the buyer of the replacement unit (v3). The second component is the 
probability that the seller correctly perceives that the unit is high quality, conditional on 
the buyer perceiving that the unit is low quality, 
tq(l - q) 
t( 1 - q) + ( 1 - t)q ' 
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multiplied by the value of a good unit (Vi). Solving for V3 yields: 
Vi= V3 _Cb= tq(._2 - q)Vi - [1 + q(l - q)]Cb. 
1 - [t + q(q - 2t)) (5) 
Case (E): Partial Warranty. Buyer always returns. (V4). The recursive expression for v4 
is: 
V4 =-Cb+ tqVi + [t(l - q) + (1 - t)q]V4. 
These three terms are, respectively, the return cost, cb: the expected value to the buyer 
if the seller refuses his claim; and the expected value to the buyer if the seller replaces 
the unit. Solving for Vi yields: 
V4 = V4 _Cb= tqVi - [1 + tq + (1 - t)(l - q)]cb. 
tq+(l-t)(l-q) (6) 
For each of these cases, we can use similar techniques to derive the expected costs 
to the seller. These valuations and costs are summarized in Table 1. 
The entries corresponding to "Full Warranty, Always Return," "No Warranty, Al-
ways Return," "No Warranty, Return Perceived Low Quality," "Partial Warranty, Never 
Return," and "Full Warranty, Never Return," are purposely omitted from the table. "Full 
Warranty, Always Return," yields infinite losses to both parties. "No Warranty, Always 
Return" and "No Warranty, Return Perceived Low Quality" are both dominated by 
"No Warranty, Never Return." Finally, "Partial Warranty, Never Return" and "Full 
Warranty, Never Return" are equivalent to "No Warranty, Never Return." Equilibria 
in these boxes either would be equivalent to other equilibria or would never occur. 
Table 1 also lacks entries for situations when, under a warranty, the buyer chooses 
to repurchase-i.e., discard a unit and buy a new one, either before, after, or instead of 
returning the original to the seller. It can be shown that this repurchase option is of no 
TABLE l 
Return All 
Units 
Return 
Perceived 
Low Quality 
Discard Low 
Quality and 
Repurchase 
Never Return 
or Repurchase 
Summary of Costs and Valuations* 
Full Warranty 
I. 
2. 
lq + (I - 1)(1 - q) 
c + [1 + q(I - 21)]c, 
lq+(l - 1)(1 -q) 
3. 
4. 
Partial Warranty 
5. 
lqVh - [1 + lq +(I - 1)(1 - q)]cb 
lq +(I - 1Xl - q) 
c + c, 
lq+ (1 - 1)(1 - q) 
6. 
lq(2 - q)Vh - [1 + q(I - q)]cb 
1 - [I+ q(q - 21)) 
7. 
8. 
c + [I + q(I - 21))c, 
1 - [I + q(q - 21)) 
No Warranty 
9. 
10. 
11. 
IQVh - Cb - [I+ q(I - 21)]p 
lq+(l -1)(1-q) 
c 
lq+(l -1)(1-q) 
12. 
c 
• Buyer expected valuations (above dashed lines) and seller expected costs (below dashed lines). 
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consequence when the equilibrium involves a warranty. 14 Hence, the five cases of Table 
1 cover all the interesting possibilities. 
In terms of Table 1, equilibrium corresponds to the box that yields the seller highest 
expected profit subject to a very important constraint. If the seller offers a warranty, he 
cannot compel the buyer to follow a particular claim strategy. The buyer chooses the 
claim strategy that is in his own best interest-i.e., yields the highest expected value for 
the buyer. Figuratively, the seller chooses the column in Table 1, but the buyer chooses 
the row, given the seller's choice of column and the seller's price. The seller takes this 
into account in formulating his warranty policy. 
Under a Full Warranty, the highest price the seller can charge is 
P;;,ax = Vi. 
The maximum expected profit under a Full Warranty is 
F C + (t + q( 1 - 2t)]cs 
7r max = V2 - tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) . (7) 
If a Partial Warranty is offered, the seller's expected profit depends on whether the buyer 
always returns or returns only units he thinks are bad. If the buyer always returns, then 
under a Partial Warranty the seller's maximum expected profit is 
PA - V: C +Cs ) 
7r max - 4 - tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) (8 
For values of q and t between 0 and 1, 
Consequently, the seller would always do better by offering a Full Warranty rather 
than a Partial Warranty if under the Partial Warranty the buyer would always return. As 
a result, "Partial Warranty, Always Return" cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, if a Partial 
Warranty is offered in equilibrium, the buyer would be choosing the "Return Perceived 
Bad Units" strategy. The seller would charge a price equal to Vi. 
Consider next the situation when No Warranty is offered. The buyer would not 
return or repurchase (Vo > Vi) if and only if 
- t(l - t)(2q - l)Vi 
p > p = (1 2) - Cb. t + q - t (9) 
If, however, p < fj, the buyer would opt to repurchase when he thinks he has a bad unit 
(Vi> Vo). The seller's maximum expected revenue when he offers No Warranty depends, 
in turn, on which strategy the buyer chooses. If the buyer chooses "No Return, No 
Repurchase," the maximum price is 
P1:.ax = Vo > ft, 
and the seller's maximum expected profit is 
The seller's maximum expected profit under "No Warranty, Buyer Repurchases Perceived 
Bad Units" is 
fj- c 
1rNR = -------
max tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) . 
14 A proof is contained in Palfrey and Romer ( 1982), which is available from the authors upon request. 
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If the seller chooses the "No Warranty" policy, he has two options: charge price ft or 
P1:.ax > ft, depending on which leads to higher expected profit. 
To summarize, the possible equilibrium price-warranty combinations are: 
(1) Full Warranty (F): p = p;;,ax = Vi (buyer returns perceived bad units); 
(2) Partial Warranty (Pl): p = p::fax = Vi (buyer returns perceived bad units); 
(3) No Warranty (N): p = P1:.ax = V0 (buyer never returns, never repurchases); 
(4) No Warranty (NR): p =ft (buyer repurchases, discards perceived bad units). 
There is, of course, also the uninteresting "No Sale" equilibrium (no strategy earns positive 
expected profit for the seller and nonnegative expected value for the buyer). 
In the first three types of equilibrium, the seller captures all the expected surplus. In 
contrast, it is interesting that in the fourth type of equilibrium, the monopolist is forced 
to yield some expected surplus to the buyer, since ft < Vi for any t and q between 0 and 
1. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the values of the parameters t, q, Vi, c, cb, 
and Cs. 
For a given set of parameter values we can characterize the "efficient" outcome as 
the price-warranty combination that maximizes expected total surplus S: the sum of 
buyer's expected surplus and seller's expected profit. Some equilibria are efficient in this 
sense, while others are not. In particular, Full Warranty is never an efficient equilibrium 
when the seller's inspection cost c,, is positive. To see this, note that expected total surplus 
under Full Warranty is: 
S F_ (V: ) C + [t + q(l - 2t)]cs _ tqVi - Cb - C - [t + q(l - 2t)]Cs 
- 2-p+p- - . 
tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) 
Under "No Warranty, Buyer Repurchases" (NR), expected total surplus is: 
SNR = Vi - p + p - C 
tq + (1 - t)(l - q) tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) 
and, for Cs > 0, 
SNR >SF. 
Nevertheless, NR may not be an equilibrium, given individual maximization by seller 
and buyer. 
In the next section, we illustrate these and other points by providing a complete 
characterization of warranty equilibrium for the case of t = .5. We also restrict our 
attention to cases in which q > .5; i.e., both buyer and seller are more likely to perceive 
quality correctly than to err. 
3. Warranty equilibrium with t = .5 and q > .5 
• With t = .5, the entries in Table 1 simplify nicely, so that this is a particularly easy 
case to analyze. (The qualitative relationships of this section apply for any t, but prices 
and the "boundaries" that separate warranty regimes depend on the value oft.) For 
expositional purposes it is useful to depict the price-warranty equilibria in terms of the 
various cost parameters. In Figures 1 through 3, we fix the values of all parameters other 
than the buyer's transaction cost cb, and depict price-warranty combinations as a function 
of Cb. 
There are three basic patterns of equilibria in this representation, according to whether 
(a) Cs< (1 - q)Vi 
or 
(b) (1 - q)Vi <Cs< (1 - q)Vi + 2q(l - q)c 
or 
(c) Cs> (1 - q)Vi + 2q(l - q)c. 
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(a) Cs< (1 - q)Vi. In this case, the seller's inspection cost is relatively low; and for any 
cb, 11':;.ax > 11'~~, so that NR is never an equilibrium. When the buyer's return cost cb is 
low, the buyer is willing to pay a high price for a Full Warranty, relative to the seller's 
expected cost for such a warranty, so that Full Warranty is the equilibrium. When cb is 
high, the buyer's willingness to pay for a warranty is considerably reduced because of the 
high expected return cost. At a low price, however, the seller is unwilling to offer a 
warranty. The equilibrium is No Warranty (buyer never returns or repurchases). For 
intermediate values of cb, the seller finds it profitable to offer a Partial Warranty. The 
buyer returns units he thinks are of low quality, and disputes are possible. 
This case is illustrated in Figure 1. The values k1 and k1 that determine the boundaries 
for warranty types are defined in the Appendix. If k 1 :::;; 0, there can be no Full Warranty 
equilibrium, while if k2 :::;; 0, only No Warranty equilibrium (or No Sale) can occur. 
(b) (1 - q)Vi <Cs< (1 - q)Vi + 2q(l - q)c. This case is similar to (a), except that the 
seller's warranty processing cost Cs is sufficiently high that, for cb ~ 0, 11'~~ > 11':;.ax, and 
Full Warranty is never an equilibrium. Now, at low values of cb, the seller maximizes 
expected profit by offering No Warranty, at a relatively low price. Because both price and 
transaction cost are low, the buyer is willing to discard units he thinks are of low quality 
and repurchase. This yields NR as the equilibrium. When the buyer's transaction cost is 
high, however, even a low price is not sufficient to induce repurchase, so that the equi-
librium is No Warranty, with no return or repurchase. At intermediate values of cb, the 
equilibrium is once again Partial Warranty (buyer returns units he thinks are bad), at a 
relatively high price. 
Figure 2 illustrates this case. Again, k3 and k2 are defined in the Appendix, and for 
k 3 :::;; 0, an NR equilibrium cannot exist. 
(c) Cs> (1 - q)Vh + 2q(l - q)c. When the seller's inspection cost is high, there can be 
no equilibrium in which a warranty is offered. Regardless of cb, the cost to the seller of 
processing claims makes warranties relatively unattractive to him. As in case (b), when 
the buyer has low transaction cost, the seller offers No Warranty, at a price sufficiently 
low for the buyer to repurchase after discarding perceived bad units. As cb rises, however, 
the seller would have to keep reducing price to induce such behavior. For sufficiently high 
cb, the seller does better by raising price. The equilibrium becomes No Warranty, with 
no return or repurchase. 
This case is shown in Figure 3. The critical value k4 is defined in the Appendix. If 
k4 :::;; 0, then only a No Warranty, No Repurchase or a No Sale equilibrium is possible. 
FIGURE 1 
PRICE-WARRANTY EQUILIBRIUM WHEN t=.5, c,< (1-q)Vh 
p 
~FULL WARRANTY, p=qVh-2cb 
K: I ~PARTIAL WARRANTY, p•V, {WITH ,.,51 
I /NO WARRANTY, p=.5Vh-cb 
I ~ (NO REPURCHASE) 
I !~ I I 
I I 
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FIGURE 2 
PR ICE-WAR RAN TY EOUILIBR IUM WHEN t =.5, (1-q)Vh < c5 < (1-q)Vh + 2q(1-q)c 
p 
(q-.5) vh 
(
NO WARRANTY, p= (q-.5) Vh-cb 
(REPURCHASE) 
~PARTIAL WARRANTY, p=V3 (WITH t=.5) 
! ~ /NO WARRANTY, p=.5Vh-cb 
I 1~(NO REPURCHASE) 
I I 
I I 
I I 
D Examples of warranty equilibrium. The following numerical examples illustrate sev-
eral outcomes, including the possibility that the equilibrium is not efficient-i.e., does 
not maximize expected surplus. These examples also provide a useful basis for the dis-
cussion in the next section, where they will reappear in our examination of DRM's. 
Example (1). t = .5, q = .75, c = 4, Cb = 4, Cs = 2, Vi = 30. The equilibrium is No 
Warranty. Buyer never returns or repurchases. Price is 11, and expected total surplus 
(=7) is maximized, given the information structure. 
Example (2). t = .5, q = .75, c = 4, Cb = 3, Cs = 1, Vi = 30. The equilibrium is Partial 
Warranty. The buyer makes a claim if he thinks he has a bad unit. The seller refuses a 
claim if he thinks the unit is good (i.e., its condition is "not covered by the warranty"). 
Price is 15.27. In this example, the equilibrium price-warranty combination maximizes 
expected total surplus (=8.73), given the information structure. 
Example (3). t = .5, q = .75, c = 4, cb = 1, Cs = 2, Vh = 30. Maximum expected total 
surplus occurs in Box 11 of Table 1 (No Warranty, Repurchase), with p = 6.5. At this 
price-warranty combination, the buyer's expected surplus is 7.5 and the seller's expected 
profit is 5.0. The seller can do better, however, by offering a Full Warranty at p = 20.5, 
thereby getting expected profit of 10.5 (which is also the expected total surplus). This 
equilibrium is inefficient. 
Example (4). t = .5, q = .75, c = 4.5, Cb= 1, Cs= 1, Vi = 20. Maximum expected total 
surplus occurs in Box 6 of Table 1 (Partial Warranty, Buyer Returns Units He Perceives 
Are Bad), with p = 11.91 and S = 4.64. If the seller offers a Partial Warranty, however, 
FIGURE 3 
PRICE-WARRANTY EQUILIBRIUM WHEN t=.5,c,>(1-q)Vh+2q(1-q)c 
p 
(q-.5)Vh 
NO WARRANTY, p=(q-.5)Vh-cb 
(REPURCHASE) 
.,..--No WARRANTY, p=.5Vh-cb 
;? (NO REPURCHASE) 
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the buyer's best claim strategy is to return all units. Returning all units yields the buyer 
higher expected value under Partial Warranty in this case than does returning only those 
he thinks are bad. If Partial Warranty is offered, therefore, the seller's expected profit is 
what he gets in Box 5. Expected profit is maximized in Box 12, which is the equilibrium: 
No Warranty, Buyer Never Returns or Repurchases. Price is 9, and expected total surplus 
is 4.5. 
Because neither party observes quality perfectly, and the seller cannot "force" the 
buyer into the box that is best for the seller, examples (3) and (4) show that in some cases 
the "first-best" solution is not an equilibrium. We stress that we are not talking about 
"first-best" relative to a full-information setting. The equilibria in examples (3) and (4) 
are inefficient, in the sense of not maximizing total expected surplus, relative to the 
imperfect information structure of the market. In these examples, the warranty is either 
"too strong," as in Example (3) or "too weak," as in Example (4). In the next section we 
introduce a framework to explore the effects of different dispute resolution mechanisms 
in mitigating (or worsening) these potential inefficiencies. 
4. Inclusion of third-party mechanism to resolve disputes 
over warranty performance 
• In our model disputes about warranties can arise naturally through the workings of 
the marketplace. Whenever Partial Warranty is the equilibrium, buyer and seller can 
potentially disagree about warranty performance. Suppose we now extend the framework 
to allow for a third party (neither buyer nor seller) to adjudicate these disputes. How does 
the availability of such a mechanism affect the market? What happens to warranties, the 
likelihood of disputes, the price of commodities, the expected surplus? How do these 
effects depend on attributes of the marketplace and the dispute resolution mechanism? 
This section proposes a way to characterize ORM's in terms of cost and information. 
We describe several exemplary mechanisms in these terms and illustrate the range of 
possible effects of these mechanisms in a series of examples. 
The ORM we have in mind would work as follows. Since potential disputes arise 
whenever a seller denies a buyer's claim under a Partial Warranty, it seems appropriate 
to structure the problem so that the buyer has the option of taking the dispute to the 
ORM for resolution. If the buyer appeals, the ORM makes a decision whether the seller 
must perform under the warranty. If the ORM agrees with the buyer, the seller must 
comply. To close the model, we assume there are no avenues of appeal beyond the ORM, 
nor are there costs of enforcing the ORM's decisions. In each dispute, the ORM's decision 
is final. We continue to allow for the possibility that the seller performs under his warranty 
(either without an appeal having taken place or because he is directed to do so by the 
ORM), replacing the unit with a new one which may, in turn, be returned by the buyer, 
etc. Thus, the recursive nature of the formal structure is retained even with the inclusion 
ofa ORM. 
One can imagine a great variety of possibilities for characterizing a ORM in more 
complete terms. We would like to abstract from the internal workings of the mechanism. 
We shall not elaborate the process the third party uses to gather evidence or make a 
judgment. Instead, we shall characterize a ORM by three important types of parameters: 
those relating to the mechanism's cost; those relating to the mechanism's precision in 
making judgments; and those relating to any bias of the mechanism. These parameters 
capture the important considerations we identified in the Introduction. 
The resource cost of operating a ORM must be taken into account in any evaluation 
of such processes. Moreover, the way the cost is divided between the two parties may 
substantially alter the incentives and hence the mechanism's effects. In our notation, Cm 
denotes the cost of the mechanism (per appeal). The proportion of this cost borne by the 
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consumer is a, and {3 is the proportion of this cost borne by the seller. We do not require 
that a+ {3 = 1. The mechanism could be subsidized by society as a whole (a + {3 < 1) 
or, instead, buyer and seller together may be required to pay more than the marginal cost 
of a dispute (a + {3 > 1 ). 
Other important aspects of a ORM are defined by two parameters, q'f and q'{', which 
are, respectively, the probability that the mechanism rules in favor of the buyer when the 
unit is actually high quality (i.e., an erroneous judgment) and the probability that the 
mechanism rules in favor of the buyer when the unit is actually low quality (i.e., a correct 
judgment). 15 
Using these parameters, we may define the precision</> of a mechanism as the prob-
ability of making a correct judgment, given that a dispute has arisen. This will generally 
depend on which return strategy the buyer follows. Two cases should be distinguished. 
In Case 1, the buyer always returns units under a partial warranty, and the buyer appeals 
all disputes. Case 2 applies when the buyer returns all units but appeals a dispute only 
ifhe perceived that the unit was low quality. Case 2 also applies when the buyer returns 
only units he perceives as low quality and appeals all disputes. Precision is then given by: 
tr tq(l - q'f) + (1 - t)(l - q)q'f' • c m ase 1 </> = tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) 
t(l - q'f) + (1 - t)q'{' in Case 2. 
In Case 2, </> is conditioned on the fact that the buyer has perceived the unit to be of low 
quality. 
One way to define the bias 8 of a mechanism is as the probability of erring in the 
buyer's favor minus the probability of erring in the seller's favor. Thus, if 8 > 0, the 
mechanism is biased in favor of the buyer, while if 8 < 0, the bias is in the seller's favor. 
As with precision, the bias will generally depend on the buyer's return and appeal strategy: 
{
tqq'f - (1 - t)(l - q)(l - q'{') . c 
m ase 1 
8 = tq + ( 1 - t)( 1 - q) 
tq'/( - (1 - t)(l - q'{') in Case 2. 
Note that -1 s; 8 s; 1, and that an unbiased mechanism has 8 = 0 for both cases. 
One can approximate a wide range of procedures by different values of q'f and 
q'{'. Some interesting possibilities (of admittedly varying degrees of reality) follow. The 
first two are mechanisms that bring additional information to bear on the decision. The 
others essentially reduce to deciding outcomes by tossing a weighted coin. Many other 
variations are possible. 
(1) The full-scale investigation or omniscient mechanism: q'f = 0, q'{' = 1. In this mech-
anism, the decision is always correct. The mechanism is perfectly precise and unbiased: 
</> = 1 and 8 = 0 regardless of the buyer's return strategy. Of course, this is a polar case, 
but it is worth considering because it at least gives some bounds as to how good (in an 
informational sense) the procedure can be. 
(2) The technical expert: q'f = Qh, q'{' = q1• A neutral outside expert, such as a second 
mechanic in the case of auto warranties or a construction engineer in the case of a home 
warranty, is called in to make a judgment. This judgment is assumed to be statistically 
independent of the judgment previously made by the seller's inspector and the buyer. 
15 Thus, the a priori probability that a DRM decides in favor of the buyeristq'/,' +(I - t)q'{'; the probability 
of deciding in favor of the seller is t( I - q'/,') + (I - t)(l - q'f'). 
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(3) The lay judge: q'/( = q'{' = 1 - t. A lay judge has neither the first-hand experience 
of the buyer, nor the expertise of the seller's inspector. The judge does, however, know 
the average quality of this type of product (t). Therefore, this judge bases his decision 
only on the ex ante probability of the unit's being good. The mechanism is imprecise 
(cf>< 1 fort < 1) and, for q > .5, it is biased in favor of the buyer in Case 1. (But () = 0 
in Case 2.) 
(4) The judge of insufficient reason: q'/( = q'{' = .5. Thisjudge16 has no information about 
the quality of the unit. He applies the principle of insufficient reason (i.e., all states are 
equally probable) and, in the interest of"fairness," rules in favor of the buyer just as often 
as he rules in favor of the seller. In fact, this mechanism is not only imprecise (cf> = .5), 
but generally biased (in favor of the buyer if t ~ .5, q > .5). 
The addition of a third party mechanism adds another stage to the sequence of 
decisions a buyer must make, and it adds one more possibility that the seller must take 
into account when choosing the warranty. The buyer has to decide whether to appeal if 
the seller refuses to grant his original claim. This decision may, of course, depend on the 
quality observed by the buyer. 
This additional complexity does not make the problem intractable in our framework. 
Since disputes can occur only when a Partial Warranty is offered, a ORM changes only 
the values of Partial Warranty strategies-areas 5 and 6 of Table 1. The expected costs 
and buyer valuations under Full Warranty and No Warranty remain the same as in areas 
2, 11, and 12 of Table 1. 
By altering the relative values of different warranty policies, a ORM will affect the 
market outcome. Some ORM's may be efficiency-enhancing-that is, they may lead to 
higher expected surplus (net of the expected costs of the mechanism) than would be 
possible in their absence. Others may have the opposite effect-they may induce market 
allocations that are inferior to the no-mechanism outcome. 
To provide an indication of this analysis, we consider briefly the special mechanism 
(1), viz., the Full Scale Investigation or Omniscient Mechanism, when the buyer bears no 
cost of the appeal process, so that a = 0. This example has illustrative appeal since it is 
a polar case in terms of both the precision of the mechanism (perfect) and the cost to the 
buyer (free). It is also particularly simple to work with, yet still admits every possible 
equilibrium. In Table 2, we indicate the expected seller costs and buyer valuations under 
this mechanism, with the additional assumption that t = .5. Since it can be shown that 
the buyer will appeal every dispute, we do not indicate in Table 2 the cases in which 
appeal is contingent on the quality perceived by the buyer. 
This mechanism may, for some values of the parameters, create inefficiency even in 
markets where the no-ORM equilibrium was efficient. This can occur in a number of 
ways. Most obviously, if Cm is sufficiently high, then even an omniscient mechanism can 
never improve on the no-mechanism equilibrium. A much more interesting and surprising 
result, however, is that even a costless (cm = 0) omniscient mechanism may induce inef-
ficiencies. This can occur in one of two ways. In one case, having this mechanism available 
moves the equilibrium from a partial warranty (in the absence of the mechanism) to a 
full warranty and in the other case, from a partial warranty (under no mechanism) to no 
warranty. The source of the problem is that under certain conditions the presence of an 
omniscient mechanism will induce a buyer to generate more disputes than he would have 
with no mechanism. As a result, the buyer will never end up with a low-quality product, 
but the seller will have to replace so many units that this more than offsets the surplus 
gain to the buyer. (Remember that the seller has no control over average product 
quality, t.) 
16 This has also been labelled The Unlearned Hand (courtesy of R. Craswell). 
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TABLE 2 Buyer's Expected Values and Seller's Expected Costs for Omniscient Mechanism 
That Is Costless to the Buyer (a = 0), with t = .5 
Full 
Warranty Partial Warranty No Warranty 
Always Return, Appeal 
All Disputes 
Return Only Perceived 
Low Quality, Appeal 
All Disputes 
Discard Low Quality 
and Repurchase 
Never Return or 
Repurchase 
I. 
2c + c, 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
qVi - (2 + q)cb 
q 
2(c + c,) + f3cm 
q 
q(2 - q)Vi - [2 + q(I - q)]cb 
I+ q(I - q) 
7. 
8. 
2c + c, + 2q(I - q)f3cm 
I + q(I - q) 
9. 
10. 
2c 
12. 
c 
To illustrate some of the possible outcomes, we repeat our earlier simple numerical 
examples (and add a new one), with the introduction ofa costless omniscient mechanism. 
Example (1). t = .5, q = .75, c = 4, cb = 4, Cs = 2, Vi = 30. A costless omniscient 
mechanism moves the equilibrium from No Warranty to Partial Warranty. Price rises 
to 16.32 and expected surplus to 7.89. 
Example (2). t = .5, q = . 75, c = 4, Cb = 3, Cs = 1, Vi = 30. With the DRM, if a Partial 
Warranty is offered, the buyer always returns units and always appeals. The seller's ex-
pected profit is maximized by offering No Warranty, at p = 12. The expected total surplus 
(=8) is lower in the equilibrium with the DRM than it was in the mechanism's absence. 
Example (2a). t = .5, q = .75, c = 5, cb = 4, Cs = 1, Vi = 41. With no DRM, the 
equilibrium is Partial Warranty, price is 21.05, and expected surplus is 13.05. The buyer 
returns units he perceives are oflow quality. With a costless, omniscient DRM, ifa partial 
warranty is offered, the buyer always returns units and always appeals disputes. Now the 
seller's expected profit is maximized by offering a Full Warranty at p = 22.75. The 
expected total surplus(= 11.75) is lower with the DRM than it would be with no DRM. 
Example (3). t = .5, q = . 75, c = 4, cb = 1, Cs = 2, Vi = 30. The introduction of a DRM 
has no effect on the equilibrium or on the maximum expected surplus. A Full Warranty 
is offered and the mechanism is never used. 
In Example (1), the existence of a DRM not only increases surplus, but it leads to 
an equilibrium where disputes occur, when in the absence of the DRM no disputes took 
place. In Examples (2) and (2a), however, a costless, omniscient DRM induces inefficiency. 
In these cases, the existence of an omniscient DRM increases the buyer's willingness to 
return units, so that all units would be returned under a partial warranty. This increases 
the frequency of disputes. The seller avoids the increased cost of having more frequent 
disputes under a partial warranty with a DRM by offering no warranty at all (as in 
Example (2)) or by offering a Full Warranty (as in Example (2a)) so that disputes can-
not occur. 
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As a foil for the omniscient mechanism, we have also computed equilibria for the 
costless Lay Judge DRM, with t = .5. With the costless omniscient mechanism, it cannot 
be optimal for the buyer not to appeal disputes ifhe makes returns under Partial Warranty. 
With the costless Lay Judge and t = .5, it is possible for some parameter values that the 
buyer returns units but does not appeal disputes. With this additional consideration, we 
derive buyer valuations and seller costs for the costless Lay Judge. For Examples (1) and 
(3), the equilibrium is the same under this DRM as with no mechanism. In Example 2, 
however, the costless Lay Judge DRM results in a Partial Warranty equilibrium in which 
the buyer returns units he thinks are low quality and appeals all disputes. Price is 15. 79 
and expected surplus is 8.21. Although expected surplus is lower than with no DRM at 
all, it is higher than under the costless omniscient mechanism. In Example (2a), the 
costless Lay Judge DRM also leads to a Partial Warranty equilibrium, with the buyer 
returning perceived low quality units and appealing all disputes. Price is 25.76 and ex-
pected surplus is 16.5, which is higher than with no DRM or with the costless omniscient 
mechanism. 
The focus on costless mechanisms has the virtue of isolating the incentive and welfare 
effects of the informational content of different DRM's. It neglects, however, two addi-
tional important considerations: the cost of the mechanism and how this cost is divided 
between buyer and seller. Absolute cost and the division of costs have different effects. 
Absolute cost affects primarily the surplus corresponding to any buyer strategy under 
partial warranty. The allocation of DRM cost between buyer and seller affects the equi-
librium warranty, but (for given total cost) does not change the surplus corresponding to 
each possible warranty-buyer strategy combination. 
These effects are clearly seen by considering a costly omniscient mechanism. The 
analysis is quite similar to the costless case, except that three additional buyer strategies 
are now possible with partial warranties. The additional strategies (which are never optimal 
when the mechanism is costless or a = 0) are: 
( 1) Buyer returns all units and appeals no disputes; 
(2) Buyer returns all units and appeals a dispute only if he perceived the unit to be 
low quality; and 
(3) Buyer returns only perceived low quality units and appeals no disputes. 
The resulting table of buyer expected values and seller expected costs differs only in the 
Partial Warranty column. These new values and costs for t = .5 are given in Table 3. 
Inspection of Table 3 reveals that increasing acm induces the buyer to avoid disputes, 
either by leading him to create disputes less frequently (i.e., return only perceived low 
quality units) or by leading him to appeal fewer of the disputes that actually occur. This 
can increase efficiency of the equilibrium for the following reason. The costless mechanism 
may result in surplus loss because it induces the buyer to engage in dispute creating 
behavior (i.e., always return under partial warranty). This imposes externalities on the 
seller, causing the seller to avoid disputes completely by offering either no warranty or 
a full warranty. A mechanism that is costly to the buyer functions as a tax that internalizes 
this externality. 
Recall that in example (2), a costless omniscient mechanism resulted in a surplus 
loss. In the same example, a costly omniscient mechanism can lead to a surplus gain (say, 
if a = fJ = .5, Cm = 5) relative to no mechanism and relative to the "free" omniscient 
mechanism. For very large costs, say a = fJ = .5 and Cm = 20, the omniscient mechanism 
will duplicate the no mechanism outcome, since disputes will never be appealed. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
• In the product quality problem we analyzed, warranties and prices provide quality 
control in the marketplace. This function can be viewed as a type of "noisy" insurance, 
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TABLE 3 Buyer's Expected Values and Seller's Expected Costs under Partial Warranty 
for Omniscient Mechanism. with t = .5 
Always Return, Appeal All Disputes 
Always Return, Appeal Disputes 
Only If Perceived Low Quality 
Always Return, Never Appeal 
Return Only Perceived Low Quality, 
Appeal All Disputes 
Return Only Perceived Low Quality, 
Never Appeal 
qV,. - (2 + q)cb - aCm 
q 
2c + 2cs + f3cm 
q 
qV,. - (3 - q(I - q)]cb - 2q(I - q)aCm 
I - q(I - q) 
2c + 2cs + 2q(I - q)f3cm 
1 - q(I - q) 
2c + 2cs 
q(2 - q)Vh - (2 + q( I - q)]cb - 2q(I - q)aCm 
I+ q(I - q) 
2c + Cs + 2q(I - q)f3cm 
I+ q(I - q) 
q(2 - q)V,. - 2(1 + q(I - q)]cb 
I+ 2q(I - q) 
2c +Cs 
I+ 2q(I - q) 
although it differs from the usual notion of insurance because it does not provide any 
risk-sharing role, since all agents are risk neutral. "Claims" are not always legitimate (i.e., 
buyers may return high-quality goods when they are only insured for low-quality goods) 
because informational imperfections do not permit the contracting parties to distinguish 
perfectly between legitimate and illegitimate claims. Quality is not perfectly observable. 
Furthermore, legitimate claims are not always honored, again because of informational 
imperfections (as opposed to purely fraudulent behavior). Nonetheless, legitimate claims 
are more likely to be made and are more likely to be honored than illegitimate claims. 
Because of informational imperfections, full insurance is not possible in the model. 
If quality were perfectly and costlessly observable, then the (risk-neutral) buyer could fully 
self-insure by repurchasing until he gets a good unit. Warranties would, at best, provide 
superfluous insurance. With imperfect information, this is no longer so. A full warranty 
provides only a single screening of quality (only the buyer screens the unit). The same 
is true with no warranty. A partial warranty provides a double screening of quality (both 
the buyer and the seller screen the unit for quality). Partial warranties may therefore 
provide better average quality than full or null warranties. This does not mean that partial 
warranties will always be better. If screening (i.e., buyers making claims and sellers pro-
cessing claims) is costly, then a partial warranty may be quite costly relative to no warranty 
or full warranty. This cost depends on the degree of informational imperfection as well 
as the actual costs of making and processing claims. Consequently, the efficient warranty 
depends on all these factors. 
The efficient warranty need not coincide with the equilibrium. One reason for this 
is that the seller can only partially control the buyer's returning policy by varying prices 
and by offering different warranties. A partial warranty may be the efficient warranty if 
the buyer returns only perceived low-quality units. But if the seller is unable to induce 
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the buyer to return only low-quality units under a partial warranty, then the equilibrium 
warranty could be full or null. An additional source of inefficiency in our model stems 
from the assumption that the seller is a monopolist. If"No Warranty, Buyer Repurchases 
Perceived Bad Units" is the efficient outcome, the seller is not able to extract all the 
consumer surplus because the price required to do this is so high that it will induce the 
buyer not to repurchase perceived bad units. If this is the case, the seller can sometimes 
do better by offering a full warranty and extracting all the surplus. 
An important feature of our model is that good faith disputes, or disputes over fact, 
occur in equilibrium between buyer and seller, and the likelihood of these disputes varies 
systematically with the underlying parameters of the model. One of the motivations for 
our approach is to analyze the impact of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
DRM's are typically set up to affect warranties, prices, the likelihood of a dispute, and 
(possibly) the distribution of surplus between buyer and seller. To compare the effect of 
different DRM's, we have formulated a model that generates disputes, that derives some 
linkages between disputes, prices, and warranties, and that makes it possible to relate 
these to the underlying product market. 
The examples we use to illustrate the comparative effects of DRM's, while suggestive 
rather than conclusive, do indicate that the interaction of a DRM with a market where 
product quality is an important consideration is quite complex. Moreover, the effects of 
DRM's may be quite surprising and counterintuitive because of complicated effects on 
buyer and seller incentives. The observation that even an "ideal" (costless and omniscient) 
mechanism may be far from ideal-causing either too much or too little warranty pro-
tection-seems particularly striking. 
Throughout the article, we made a number of simplifying assumptions. For example, 
we assumed that buyer and seller are risk neutral. One could allow for risk aversion, so 
that warranties would serve a risk-sharing role. This would tend to reinforce incentives 
already present to have warranties. Because risk aversion would also obfuscate the quality 
control role of warranties, we took agents to be risk neutral. Additional quality levels or 
a quality continuum might add some realism to the model and provide a richer variety 
of possible warranty contracts. We expect that the basic relationships among prices, extent 
of warranty, and the parameters of the market would not change dramatically with the 
introduction of more than two quality levels. 
A particularly strong assumption is that the seller has no direct control over average 
"intrinsic" quality, t. We know that the type of warranty policy that emerges is sensitive 
to this parameter, with or without a DRM. We expect that, were it not too costly, the 
firm might choose to adjust quality control or prescreen specific units to affect buyer 
claim strategies. If so, then an additional impact of a DRM would be to alter average 
intrinsic quality at the time of sale. Incorporating such effects would be a useful elaboration 
of our model. 
Moving further afield from the central concern of our analytical framework, we 
believe there is an important set of phenomena involving legal/economic interactions 
that may potentially be addressed from the perspective of this model. Given the uncer-
tainty present in most economies, contractual arrangements often involve specific ref-
erences or contingencies that are inherently not observable with certainty. Because of this, 
whether conditions of a contract have been satisfied cannot always be treated as a clearcut 
event. One party may feel that the contract has been performed, while the other may 
not. In such situations, the particular institutions used to resolve disputes may be very 
important in determining contractual form and economic allocation. The simple warranty 
environment examined here is but one example. The type of analysis we have outlined 
can be adapted to evaluate different contractual contexts, and can lead to insights about 
the efficiency of the contractual arrangements, as well as the efficacy of different appeals 
procedures designed to resolve the disputes over "fact" that will naturally arise. 
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Appendix 
• Let 
qVi(2q - 1)(1 - q) 
ao = 1 + 4q(l - q) 
a1 = (q - .5)Vi - (2c +Cs) 
a2 = (q - .5) Vi - (c + Cs) 
a3 = (q - .5)Vi - [1 - 2q(l - q)]c - Cs 
bi = -(l - q)2(l + 4q) Vi - 4q(l + q)c + Cs 
2q(l - q) 
b2 = (2q - 1.5)Vi - c. 
If cb < a0 , then Vi> Vi: buyer always returns under Partial Warranty. 
Define 
Pl _ q(2 - q)Vi - 2[1 + q(l - q)]cb - 2c - Cs 
1f'max - • 1 + 2q(l - q) 
Then 
Reversing the inequalities on the left reverses the inequalities on the right. 
The parameters k 1, k2 , k3 , and k4 in Figures 1-3 are defined as follows: 
k1 = min [a2, max (ao, a1)] 
k2 = a3 
k3 = min [b2, max (ao, b1)] 
k4 = b2 
Under Case (a) (i.e., Cs < ( 1 - q) Vi), the following variation on Figure 1 holds when 
Full Warranty 
No Warranty (No Repurchase) 
Partial Warranty 
No Warranty (No Repurchase) 
if 
if 
if 
if 
Cb::::; a2; 
a2 < cb::::; ao; 
ao < cb::::; a3; 
Cb> a3. 
Under Case (b) (i.e., (1 - q) Vi < Cs < ( 1 - q) Vi + 2q(l - q)c), the following variation 
on Figure 2 holds when b2 < a0 < a3 : 
No Warranty (Repurchase) 
No Warranty (No Repurchase) 
Partial Warranty 
No Warranty (No Repurchase) 
if 
if 
if 
if 
Cb::::; b2; 
b2 <Cb::::; ao; 
ao < cb::::; a3; 
Cb> a3. 
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